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The Safest Bet: A Comprehensive Review 
of the Fall of PASPA and the Rise of Sports 
Betting 
Daniel Boswell* 
In May of 2018, the United States Supreme Court held in Murphy 
v. National Collegiate Athletic Association that a federal 
prohibition on sports gambling was in violation of the anti-
commandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amendment. In the wake of 
the decision, many commentators have opined that the opinion, 
authored by Justice Alito, may have serious implications on 
contentious political issues ranging from marijuana legalization 
to sanctuary cities. While the decision left state legislatures with 
the authority to permit sports gambling, it did not affirmatively 
close the door on federal oversight—a topic of much recent 
debate. This note will explore potential regulatory options at 
Congress’ disposal in a post-Murphy world. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 
1992 
America’s sports gambling landscape was changed forever in the 
wake of a late-1980’s scandal involving Major League Baseball’s all-time 
hits leader, Pete Rose. The Dowd Report, a 1989 investigatory piece 
authored by Special Counsel to the Commissioner John Dowd, asserted 
that Rose had placed wagers on a number of Cincinnati Reds baseball 
games during the 1987 season, while he was the Reds’ manager.1 As a 
result, Pete Rose was effectively banished from Major League Baseball 
 
1  See generally JOHN DOWD, DOWD REPORT (1989).  
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for life, and a cloud formed over the integrity of professional sports.2 
Subsequent legislative action would attempt to alleviate growing national 
hysteria and scrub the stain of the Rose scandal from American sports.3  
The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”), was 
first introduced in the United States Senate by Sen. Dennis DeConcini in 
late February of 1991.4 Following its proposal, various Senate and House 
Judiciary subcommittees convened to discuss the “national problem”5: 
sports gambling. A 1991 Senate report explained that the “purpose of 
[PASPA] is to prohibit sports gambling conducted by, or authorized under 
the law of, any State or other government entity . . . to maintain the 
integrity of our national pastime.”6 PASPA gained popularity with support 
ranging from the commissioners of the four major sports leagues to 
evangelical leaders.7 A year and a half after its proposal, the Senate sent 
PASPA to the House of Representatives with overwhelming approval; 
PASPA was soon thereafter endorsed with approval by the House.8 On 
October 28th, 1992, President George H.W. Bush signed PASPA into law.9  
PASPA made it unlawful for state governments to “sponsor, operate, 
advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law . . . [a] betting, gambling, 
or wagering scheme based . . . on one or more competitive games in which 
amateur or professional athletes participate . . . or on one or more 
performances of such athletes in such games.”10 This blanket prohibition 
was followed by multiple exceptions pertaining to PASPA’s 
 
2  See Ross Newhan, Pete Rose Barred From Baseball by Giamatti: Reds' Manager Can 
Seek Reinstatement From Life Ban in Year; He Denies He Bet on the Sport, L.A. TIMES 
(Aug. 25, 1989), http://articles.latimes.com/1989-08-25/news/mn-1036_1_pete-rose.  
3 See id.; see also Michelle Minton, Legalizing Sports Betting in the United States, 
COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (Mar. 15, 2018), https://cei.org/content/legalizing-
sports-betting-united-states (“Without federal legislation, sports gambling is likely to 
spread on a piecemeal basis and ultimately develop an irreversible momentum.”); see also 
David Purdum, Sports betting legalization: How we got here, ESPN (May 22, 2018), 
http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/23561576/chalk-line-how-got-legalized-sports-
betting (then-U.S. Rep. and former NBA player Tom McMillen explaining that “It was 
very non-controversial. It was right in the Pete Rose aftermath”).  
4 S. 474, 102nd Cong. (1992).   
5 Bill Bradley, The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act—Policy Concerns 
Behind Senate Bill 474, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 5, 9 (1992).  
6 S. REP. NO. 102-248 (1991); see also Will Green, The Scope of PASPA: Parsing the Intent 
of the Federal US Sports Betting Law, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (Nov. 23, 2016), 
http://www.legalsportsreport.com/12205/paspa-scope-and-intent-us-sports-betting/ 
(indicating that the intent of PASPA was to strictly prohibit the expansion of sports 
gambling into new sports).   
7 See S. REP. NO. 102-248.  
8 The United States Senate passed PASPA with 88 votes in favor and 5 votes against in 
the Roll Call Vote for the 2nd Session of the 102nd Congress.  
9 Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2012).  
10 Id.  
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applicability.11 First, PASPA would not apply to any State that had a State-
conducted gambling scheme in operation at any time between January 1st, 
1976 and August 31st, 1990.12 Second, PASPA would not apply to any 
State that had a gambling scheme authorized by statute as of October 2nd, 
1991, and had conducted such a scheme at any time between September 
1st, 1989 and October 2nd, 1991.13 Third, New Jersey was specifically 
afforded a one-year grace period to authorize sports gambling, therefore, 
allowing the state to avoid PASPA’s blanket prohibition.14 
Senator Bill Bradley—a former New York Knicks guard and two-time 
NBA champion—was an early co-sponsor of PASPA, providing the bill 
with the jumpstart it needed to gain popularity. Though PASPA passed 
through Congress with thumping majorities in both the Senate and the 
House, it did have detractors. Senator Chuck Grassley championed states’ 
rights.15 Therefore, his initial concern focused on PASPA’s state-specific 
“grandfathering” scheme for exemptions from PASPA’s blanket 
prohibition.16 Specifically, Senator Grassley believed that PASPA’s 
scheme to prohibit sports gambling unfairly discriminated against many 
states in favor of just a few.17  
Senator Grassley also initially flagged PASPA as a federalism issue, 
warning against the precedent the legislation would establish by allowing 
the Federal Government to prohibit state revenue raising programs.18 
Grassley argued that “determinations of how to raise revenue have 
typically been left to the States.”19  
Finally, Grassley voiced a concern that PASPA’s grandfathering 
provisions would create a single-seller market for lawful sports 
gambling.20 The resulting federal monopoly, Grassley argued, would 
slight the majority of the states by unfairly reserving an already multi-
billion-dollar industry for just a few states.21 
 
11  See id. § 3704(a).  
12  Id. § 3704(a)(1). 
13  Id. § 3704(a)(2).  
14  Id. § 3704(a)(3); see also Ryan M. Rodenberg & John T. Holden, Sports Betting Has 
an Equal Sovereignty Problem, 67 DUKE L. J. ONLINE 1, 6 (2017).  
15  138 CONG. REC. 12,974 (1992) (statement of Sen. Grassley).  
16  Id. at 12,974-75.  
17  Id. (“This bill purports to restrict gambling on sporting events by prohibiting certain 
States from conducting sports lotteries, and it does so by discriminating against many 
States . . . and preferring four States.”).  
18  See S. REP. NO. 102-248 (1991).  
19  Id.  
20  See id.  
21  See id.  
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B. New Jersey’s Challenges to PASPA 
Senator Grassley’s concerns about the constitutionality of PASPA 
proved prescient. On August 7, 2012, the four major professional sports 
leagues, plus the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) filed 
suit against then-New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, alleging that the 
enactment of a 2012 New Jersey law permitting regulated sports betting in 
licensed locations within the state violated PASPA prohibitions.22 The 
District Court granted an injunction for the sports leagues, and New Jersey 
appealed to the Third Circuit. Ruling in favor of the sports leagues, the 
Third Circuit held in pertinent part that: (1) PASPA did not violate the 
equal sovereignty doctrine;23 and (2) PASPA did not violate the anti-
commandeering restrictions of the Tenth Amendment.24  
However, the Third Circuit planted a seed in the anti-commandeering 
section of its opinion that would become the basis of future litigation.25 In 
a discussion on whether PASPA prohibits New Jersey from repealing its 
own anti-sports wagering provisions, the court stated that PASPA does not 
“prohibit New Jersey from repealing its ban on sports wagering.”26 Thus, 
the Third Circuit left open the possibility that New Jersey could repeal its 
own prohibition on sports betting at licensed casinos and racetracks 
throughout the state without running afoul of PASPA.27 
In 2014, the New Jersey state legislature took the message 
promulgated by the Third Circuit (even citing the court’s dicta on state 
authority to repeal prohibitions on sports betting)28 by passing a revised 
version of its 2012 bill into law.29 Rather than authorizing sports gambling 
within the state—as the 2012 bill attempted to do—the revision acted as a 
repeal to a 1977 New Jersey law banning sports gambling.30 Following 
Governor Chris Christie’s signature of the bill on October 7, 2014, New 
 
22  See Compl., NCAA v. Christie, 926 F.Supp.2d 551, 561 (D.N.J. 2013).  
23 See Shelby County. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 544 (2013); see also NCAA v. Governor 
of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 237 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[F]ar from singling out a handful of states for 
disfavored treatment, PASPA treats more favorably a single state.”).  
24 See NCAA, 730 F.3d at 237 (“We hold that PASPA does not violate the anti-
commandeering doctrine.”).  
25  See id. at 232 (“But we do not read PASPA to prohibit New Jersey from repealing its 
ban on sports wagering.”).  
26  Id.  
27  See id. (emphasis added); see also Minton, supra note 3.   
28  S. 2460, 2014 Leg., 216th Sess. (N.J. 2014) (highlighting the Third Circuit’s 
interpretation of PASPA where it “stated that it does ‘not read PASPA to prohibit New 
Jersey from repealing its ban on sports wagering’”).  
29  Id.  
30  Id. (The 1977 bill prohibited gambling by anyone under age 21 within the state and 
prevented betting on sports teams from New Jersey).  
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Jersey was intent on accepting sports bets at its racetracks and casinos as 
early as the following month.31  
The major sports leagues filed suit against New Jersey again, just three 
days after Governor Christie signed the bill into law.32 In spite of the Third 
Circuit’s admonition that PASPA did not bar New Jersey from repealing 
its own sports gambling prohibitions, the sports leagues maintained that 
the New Jersey state legislature had violated PASPA by doing just that.33 
Both the District Court and the Third Circuit found in favor of the sports 
leagues.34 However, the make-up of the Third Circuit’s panel in this case 
was likely essential to obtaining Supreme Court review.35 The judge who 
wrote the majority opinion in Christie I—ruling against New Jersey—
found in favor of New Jersey in Christie II.36 As a result, the Third Circuit 
granted New Jersey’s request for en banc review of the case.37 
 Although the en banc review was facially unsuccessful for New 
Jersey, as the full panel of Third Circuit judges voted 9-3 in favor of 
affirming the prior ruling, the nature of the review was a win for New 
Jersey.38 On October 7, 2016, New Jersey filed its appeal with the United 
States Supreme Court.39 And on June 27, 2017, the Supreme Court 
announced that it would agree to hear New Jersey’s appeal of the Third 
Circuit’s decision.40  
C. Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association41  
On December 4, 2017, the Supreme Court heard the oral arguments 
for the State of New Jersey and the major sports leagues.42 The parties’ 
 
31  See David Purdum & Ryan Rodenburg, The odds of legalized sports betting: New 
Jersey vs. the leagues, ESPN (May 14, 2018), 
http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/22605881/the-odds-legalized-sports-betting-new-
jersey-vs-leagues.  
32  See Compl., NCAA. v. Christie, 61 F.Supp.3d 488 (D.N.J. 2014).  
33  See id.  
34  See NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 799 F.3d 259, 261 (3d Cir. 2015) (“PASPA, by its 
terms, prohibits states from authorizing by law sports gambling, and the 2014 [New Jersey] 
Law does exactly that.”).  
35  See id.  
36  See id.  
37  See id. (en banc).  
38  See id.  
39  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Christie v. NCAA, No. 16-476, 2016 WL 5940876, 
at *6 (3d Cir. 2016).  
40  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 832 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 
2016), cert. granted, Murphy v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).  
41  Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S.Ct. 1461 (2018) (When Phil Murphy was sworn in as 
governor of New Jersey, “Christie v. National Collegiate Athletic Association” was 
changed to “Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association.”).   
42  See Oral Argument Transcript, Murphy, 138 S.Ct. 1461 (No. 16-476). 
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main arguments and how the Court dealt with the answers to each inquiry 
will be described below.  
i. Anti-Commandeering Principle  
As it had for the better half of a decade, New Jersey relied primarily 
on two Supreme Court decisions supporting the argument that PASPA was 
unconstitutional because it was effectively a violation of the anti-
commandeering principle of the Tenth Amendment.43 It relied on New 
York v. United States, in which the Court held a challenged federal law 
unconstitutional because it ordered the State to regulate in accordance with 
federal standards.44 It also relied on Printz v. United States, in which the 
Court held a federal statute unconstitutional because it compelled state 
officers to enforce federal law.45 New Jersey contended that any state law 
that has the effect of permitting sports gambling, including a law totally or 
partially repealing a prior prohibition, amounts to an authorization.46 
Conversely, New Jersey argued that PASPA requires the states to maintain 
their existing laws outlawing sports betting.47 The effect of PASPA, 
therefore, was to compel state officers to enforce federal law, like in 
Printz, thereby violating the anti-commandeering principle inherent in the 
Tenth Amendment.48 
Alternatively, the sports leagues attempted to frame the challenged 
PASPA provision narrowly, claiming PASPA does not commandeer the 
New Jersey State government because the provision lacked language 
requiring affirmative action by the State.49 Distinguishing between 
PASPA and the laws challenged in New York and Printz, the sports leagues 
argued that the laws in those cases were invalid because they “told states 
what they must do instead of what they must not do.”50 Therefore, 
according to the sports leagues: “commandeering occurs ‘only when 
Congress goes beyond precluding state action and affirmatively 
commands it.’”51  
 
43  See Murphy, supra note 40, at 1471. (The State relied primarily on New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)).  
44  Id. (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)).  
45  Id. (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)).  
46  Id. at 1473 (“Petitioners argue that the anti-authorization provision requires States to 
maintain their existing laws against sports gambling without alteration.”).  
47  Id.  
48  Id.  
49  Id.   
50  Id. at 1478.   
51  Id.  
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The Court was unpersuaded by the sports leagues’ interpretation 
requiring an “affirmative” federal command to the states.52 Instead, the 
Court sided with New Jersey, finding that the PASPA provision 
prohibiting state authorization of sports gambling did violate the anti-
commandeering rule.53  
ii. Supremacy Clause 
The sports leagues also defended PASPA’s anti-authorization 
provision on the ground that it was a valid preemption provision under the 
Supremacy Clause.54 That is, that the provision should preempt any New 
Jersey state law on sports gambling.55 The Court noted that for the PASPA 
provision to preempt state law it must: (1) represent the exercise of a power 
conferred to Congress by the Constitution; and (2) the PASPA provision 
must be best read as one that regulates private actors.56 Rejecting this 
argument, however, the Court held that “the PASPA provision prohibiting 
state authorization of sports gambling is not a preemption provision 
because there is no way in which this provision can be understood as a 
regulation of private actors.”57  
iii. Policy Disagreements  
At the heart of New Jersey’s original suit to take down PASPA was 
the state’s financial struggles resulting from operations like Atlantic City’s 
casinos and horse racing tracks.58 However, Governor Christie’s potential 
solution was a possible $600 million influx in additional revenue should 
sports gambling be legalized, which could operate as at least a small fix to 
the state’s budget crisis.59  
Indeed, in an amicus brief filed in support of New Jersey, the 
American Gaming Association (“AGA”) opined that, generally, “a legal 
 
52  See id. at 1472 (explaining that precluding state action and requiring affirmative state 
action are both subject to commandeering scrutiny because “[i]n either event, state 
legislatures are put under the direct control of Congress.”).  
53  Id. at 1478 (holding that “[t]he PASPA provision at issue here—prohibiting state 
authorization of sports gambling—violates the anticommandeering rule.”).  
54  Id. at 1479.  
55  Id.  
56  See id. at 1480 (“Congress enacts a law that imposes restrictions or confers rights on 
private actors; a state law confers rights or imposes restrictions that conflict with the federal 
law; and therefore, the federal law takes precedence and the state law is preempted.”).  
57  Id. at 1481 (emphasis added).  




59  Id.  
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sports-betting industry could generate up to $26.6 billion in total economic 
impact every year though GDP increases, tax[] dollars, and over 150,000 
well-paying American jobs.”60 Moreover, state governments would “be 
able to capitalize on these benefits by, for example, directing new revenues 
to law enforcement, social services, and other matters of vital citizen 
interest.”61 Solely in Nevada, it was estimated that a fully mature sports 
betting market generated around $4.9 billion in spending on sports 
gambling in 2017.62  
Moreover, it was evident that PASPA had not eliminated corrupt sport 
match-fixing practices in its entirety, despite the law’s widespread 
support.63 Thus, in spite of PASPA’s original intention to stop the spread 
of state-sponsored sports gambling, New Jersey and its supporters also 
argued that the statute effectively drove the sports gambling market 
underground, while simultaneously taking tax revenue away from the 
states and indirectly placing it into the hands of illegal offshore entities.64 
To put the size of this underground market in context, the AGA estimated 
that Americans illegally bet over $150 billion per year on U.S. sporting 
events.65 The market is not only dense, but also well-organized: in a 2015 
investigation, the New York Times uncovered over 100 gambling sites—
none of which were licensed by the state—connected to the internet at a 
Piscataway, New Jersey data center.66 Thus, New Jersey posed the 
question: if PASPA not only failed to attain the goals it set out to achieve, 
but effectively promoted an underground market by inhibiting states’ 
ability to raise revenue, why was it still on the books?  
 Still, for years, the sports leagues and numerous lawmakers took 
solace in the fact that PASPA was purportedly sustaining the integrity of 
 
60  See Brief for American Gaming Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners 
at 18, Murphy, 138 S. Ct. 1480 (Nos. 16-476, 16-477).  
61  Id.  
62  Minton, supra note 3. 
63  See generally Eric Ramsey, Tennis Still Has A Betting Integrity Problem, We’re 
Reminded At Wimbledon, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (Jul. 13, 2018, 8:25 PDT), 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/21922/tennis-integrity-wimbledon/, (“Leaked 
documents identify a ‘core group’ of 16 players ranked in the top 50, including Grand Slam 
winners, repeatedly flagged for fixing. Some had been offered $50,000 or more to throw 
matches. None faced discipline, and all were still competing at the time of the report.”).  
64  See NCAA, supra note 23.  
65  Brief for American Gaming Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 
1, Murphy, 138 S. Ct. 1480 (No. 16-476).   
66  See Bogdanich, Glanz & Armendariz, Cash Drops and Keystrokes: The Dark Reality 
of Sports Betting and Daily Fantasy Games, N.Y. TIMES, 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/10/15/us/sports-betting-daily-fantasy-games-
fanduel-draftkings.html?module=inline (last visited Sep. 16, 2019).  
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professional and collegiate athletics.67 Moreover, PASPA’s supporters 
argued that the law would “protect sports from becoming a vehicle for 
promoting gambling among teenagers, ensuring that the values of 
character, cooperation, and good sportsmanship that have figured so 
heavily in the growth of athletic competition throughout American history 
were not significantly compromised.”68 
 While PASPA’s supporters believed their stance on the issue of 
PASPA’s actual utility to be morally superior, the protections that the law 
warranted to consumers may not have been so protective after all.69 Many 
pundits hypothesize that the prohibitions of PASPA actually left 
consumers without legal protections when placing illegal wagers on sports 
and that PASPA created a more conducive environment for match-
fixing.70 
II. MURPHY’S IMMEDIATE IMPACT  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy has had an enormous impact 
on sports betting in the United States. By the start of the 2019 calendar 
year, seven states had regulated sports gaming industries, with over twenty 
more such bills filed in 2019.71  
The remainder of Part II will examine significant adaptations to sports 
betting laws, beginning with Nevada, and continuing with the laws 
adopted by states that were among the first to regulate sports betting 
following the Murphy decision.72  
A. Nevada 
Nevada was the pioneer for legalized sports gambling.73 Riding the 
success of Las Vegas’ newly legalized gambling market, Nevada became 
the first state to legalize sports betting, which had previously operated in 
 
67  See Dustin Gouker, Three Giant Lies Sen. Orrin Hatch Just Told About Sports Betting, 
THE LINES (May 23, 2018), https://www.thelines.com/orrin-hatch-lies-on-sports-betting/. 
68  See Bradley, supra note 5, at 6.  
69  See Gouker, supra note 67.  
70  Id.  
71  Dustin Gouker, Legislative Tracker: Sports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (Sep. 4, 
2019, 10:02 PDT), 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/sportsbetting-bill-tracker/.  
72  The applicability of the figures and information provided in this section may only be 
relevant as of August of 2019.  
73  See Aaron Gray, The Vegas Era: Major Sports Betting Legislation in the USA (Part 
II), SPORTS BETTING DIME, https://www.sportsbettingdime.com/guides/legal/sports-
betting-history-part-ii/ (last updated Jan. 25, 2019).  
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underground and organized crime associations throughout the country.74 
In 1949, sportsbooks (originally called “Turf Clubs”) began to pop up all 
over Las Vegas.75 However, it was only fun and games for two years, at 
which point the federal government got involved in Nevada’s sports 
gambling industry for the first time.76  
In 1951, Congress levied a 10% federal excise tax on Las Vegas 
sportsbooks, which the books had to comply with to stay in operation.77 
While a 10% tax on the sportsbooks profits alone would have been harsh, 
this particular tax was on a sportsbooks’ entire “handle”78 (total betting 
revenue), which meant that the books would have to pay a 10% tax as well 
as pay their customers’ winning bets back after they settled.79 However, in 
1974, Congress decreased the 10% tax to 2%, and again in 1984 from 2% 
to 0.5%.80 Accordingly, the decreased burden on Nevada casinos allowed 
the sportsbooks to generate more revenue than ever before.81  
B. Delaware 
In 2009, Delaware attempted to expand upon its already existing 
lottery system to include expanded forms of its parlay product.82 
Following the Court’s decision in Murphy, Delaware won the race to the 
sports betting market.83 Delaware had reason to get on the ball early—the 
state only has about one million residents, and its fiduciary budget is 
heavily reliant on tourism from nearby states.84 According to Delaware’s 
Director of Tourism, 17% of the state’s visitors participate in its gaming 
industry.85 Thus, adopting a legalized sports betting scheme early on came 
 
74  See id.  
75  See id.  
76  See id.  
77  See id.  
78  See generally Sports Betting Handle vs. Revenue, THE LINES (May 24, 2018), 
https://www.thelines.com/sports-betting-handle-revenue/ (defining “handle” as “the total 
amount of money wagered by bettors at a sportsbook over a given period,” and defining 
“revenue” as “the amount of money a sportsbook retains from total handle after paying out 
winners.”).  
79  Gray, supra note 73.  
80  Id.    
81  See id.  
82  Delaware Sports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT, 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/delaware (last updated Aug. 9, 2019). 
83  See id. (“Delaware law permits sports betting, and became the first state outside of 
Nevada to book a legal, single-game wager.”).  
84  See Eric Ramsey, Welcome to Delaware Sports Betting: Live Updates as State Joins 
Nevada With Single-Game Wagering, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (June 5, 2018, 8:47 PM), 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/20945/delaware-begins-booking-first-sports-bets-
outside-nevada/.  
85  Id.  
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as both an immediate financial incentive for Delaware, as well as a 
promotional opportunity for the state throughout the northeast.86 
By June of 2018, three casinos were permitted to accept bets in 
Delaware: Dover Downs, Delaware Park, and Harrington Raceway & 
Casino.87 Yet, these casinos must deal with a tax structure very different 
from the one used in Nevada.88 After winning bets are paid out, Delaware 
casinos are required to share 12.5% of their sportsbook handle with 
Scientific Games, the entity in charge of providing gambling products and 
services to the state’s casinos.89 After paying Scientific Games, the casinos 
are effectively taxed by Delaware at a 60% rate, because 50% of 
sportsbooks’ winnings are directly taxed by the state, while an additional 
10% goes towards supplementing horse racing purses from races run at 
Delaware race tracks.90  
C. New Jersey  
While Delaware won the race to the sports betting industry post-
Murphy, New Jersey won best-in-show by taking full advantage of the 
decision.91 On June 11, 2018, former Governor Christie’s dream of legal 
sports wagering in the Garden State came to fruition when Governor Phil 
Murphy signed the sports betting bill into law.92 Compared with 
Delaware’s three casinos accepting bets, New Jersey features up to nine 
casinos that can be accessed in person.93 In Atlantic City alone, six casinos 
 
86  See id.  
87  See Rick Maese, Delaware is the First New State to Bet on Sports Gambling, but it 
Might Not Pay Off, WASH. POST (June 5, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2018/06/05/delaware-first-to-bet-on-
sports-gambling-but-it-might-not-pay-off/?utm_term=.bc842b422948.  
88  See Adam Candee, Is It ‘Revenue Sharing’ or High Taxes for Sports Betting? Ask 
Rhode Island, Delaware How They Slice the Pie, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (July 3, 2018, 
5:46 PM), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/21663/sports-betting-revenue-sharing/.  
89  See id.  
90  See id.  
91  See generally Associated Press, ‘Stunning’ numbers show N.J. has fallen in love with 
sports betting, N.J.COM (Oct. 12, 2018), 
https://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2018/10/stunning_numbers_show_nj_has_fallen_in_l
ove_with_sports_betting.html (“And it's already becoming clear that sports gamblers 
prefer to do their betting online or over their smart phones. Of the $336 million in sports 
bets made in New Jersey so far, $210 million were placed online as opposed to a casino or 
racetrack.”).  
92  See Ryan Hutchins, Murphy Signs New Jersey Sports Betting Law After 7-Year Legal 
Fight, POLITICO (June 11, 2018, 4:17 PM), https://www.politico.com/states/new-
jersey/story/2018/06/11/murphy-signs-new-jersey-sport-betting-law-after-7-year-legal-
fight-461275.  
93  See Post Sports Desk, NJ Sports Betting: Where and how to Place Bets, N.Y. POST 
(Dec. 17, 2018, 11:12 AM), 
https://nypost.com/2018/12/17/nj-sports-betting-where-and-how-to-place-bets/. 
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are now accepting sports wagers.94 Moreover, New Jersey took full 
advantage of its new law with online forums and a handful of mobile 
betting apps, which can be accessed throughout the Garden State.95 
Already, New Jersey’s online gaming industry has taken over retail venues 
in total value of bets made.96 In November 2018 alone, a staggering 72% 
of money wagered on sports in New Jersey came via mobile and online 
channels.97 
Sports wagering in New Jersey is overseen by the New Jersey Division 
of Gaming Enforcement.98 Sports betting at traditional sportsbooks is 
taxed at 8.5%, while entities accepting wagers online via URL’s and 
mobile apps are taxed at a 13% rate.99 Of note, New Jersey overtook 
Nevada for the highest monthly gaming handle generated in one state in 
May and June of 2019.100 As evidenced by these awards, New Jersey has 
seen the most immediate success from its victory in legalized sports 
gaming, but the sustainability of that success may be threatened by 
legalization attempts in nearby states with potentially large online sports 
betting markets, such as Pennsylvania and New York.  
 
94  See id.   
95  See id. 
96  Associated Press, supra note 91.  
97  Nicholaus Garcia, New Jersey Sports Betting Revenue Pulled in a Record November 
Haul, PLAY USA (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.playusa.com/new-jersey-sports-betting-
november/.  
98  The Division of Gaming Enforcement has already shown that it will not hesitate to 
discipline New Jersey sportsbooks that fail to comply with current state law. See Erik 
Gibbs, New Info Emerges on Caesars’ Illegal Sports Bets in New Jersey, 
CALVINAYRE.COM (Jan. 10, 2019), https://calvinayre.com/2019/01/10/business/new-info-
emerges-caesars-illegal-sports-bets-new-jersey/ (showing the New Jersey Division of 
Gaming Enforcement discipline of Caesars Entertainment); see also Steven Stradbrooke, 
Rush Street Fined $30k for Underage NJ Online Gambling, CALVINAYRE.COM (Jan. 24, 
2019), https://calvinayre.com/2019/01/24/business/new-jersey-fines-rush-street-
underage-online-gambling/ (showing New Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement’s 
discipline of Rush Street Interactive).  
99  David Danzis, Sports Betting Taxes on Par with Projections, PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY 
(Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.pressofatlanticcity.com/news/press/casinos_tourism/sports-
betting-taxes-on-par-with-projections/article_6cb9b715-d085-58d0-8f58-
d9947448b2d6.html.  
100  See Adam Candee, Jersey Sure! NJ Sports Betting Passes Nevada for the First Time, 
LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (June 27, 2019), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/34031/nj-
sports-betting-nevada-revenue-may-2019/; see also Dustin Gouker, New Jersey is the 
Leader of US Sports Betting, Beats Nevada Handle in July, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (Aug. 
28, 2019), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/35242/nevada-vs-new-jersey-july-sports-
betting/.  
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D. Mississippi  
Mississippi officially became the fourth state (not including Nevada) 
to offer single-game sports wagering on August 1, 2018, just in time to 
accept wagers on the upcoming college football season.101 Mississippi 
immediately gained a regional edge, becoming the first state in the 
southeast to adopt legalized sports betting post-Murphy.102 The popular 
MGM sportsbook opened wagering activities at popular casinos in Biloxi 
and Tunica.103 However, mobile and online wagering is currently not 
permitted outside of Mississippi’s licensed casinos and, following the 
death of both Mississippi House Bill 1481 and Senate Bill 2667 in 
February of 2019, this is likely to remain the case.104  
Wagering within Mississippi is controlled by the Mississippi Gaming 
Commission (“MGC”).105 Mississippi sportsbooks are required to pay a 
12% tax on their hold after paying out winning bets, which is slightly 
higher than the New Jersey rate.106 Breaking that down, casinos in 
Mississippi pay 8% of their winnings to the state government and 4% of 
their winnings to the local municipalities in which they are located.107 
E. West Virginia  
West Virginia was ahead of the game, enacting a sports betting law in 
March 2018 that took effect once Murphy was decided.108 Thus, West 
Virginia was among one of the first states to offer regulated sports 
wagering following the decision, with its first bet paying out the day legal 
sports betting was first offered on September 1st, 2018.109 At its launch, 
West Virginia featured just one sportsbook, the Hollywood Casino in 
 
101  Mississippi’s legal sports betting scheme came just in time to accept wagers on the 
upcoming football season. See Adam Candee, New Day for Ole Miss as Mississippi Sports 
Betting Launches, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (Aug. 1, 2018), 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/22474/mississippi-sports-betting-launches/.  
102  See id.  
103  See id.  
104  See id.; see also Adam Candee, Goodbye Mobile Mississippi Sports Betting Bills, We 
Hardly Knew Ye, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (Feb. 6, 2019), 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/28856/mobile-mississippi-sports-betting-bills-die/.  
105  Mississippi Sports Betting: Mississippi Sports Betting FAQ, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT, 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/mississippi/ (last updated Aug. 6, 2019) (The MGC “is 
charged with regulation oversight of the industry.”).  
106  See Bobby Harrison, Mississippi Rings Up $1 Million in Revenue from Sports Betting, 
SUN HERALD (Dec. 14, 2018, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.sunherald.com/news/business/casino-gambling/article223079670.html.  
107  Id.  
108  See West Virginia Sports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT, 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/wv/ (last updated Aug. 28, 2019, 1:34 PM).   
109  See id.   
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Charlestown, in partnership with William Hill sportsbooks.110 Yet, as of 
late December 2018, the state boasted five fully operative sportsbooks as 
well as an important online sports wagering platform.111 Sports gaming 
wagers in West Virginia are overseen by the state’s Lottery Commission 
and are taxed by the state at a 10% clip.112  
F. Pennsylvania 
Pennsylvania became the seventh state to begin accepting wagers on 
sporting events in mid-November 2018, permitting wagers on both 
professional and collegiate activities, as well as accepting bets both in 
person and via mobile device platforms.113 Notably, the state’s Gaming 
Control Board has come under scrutiny for the high tax rates it places on 
sports betting when compared to other states.114 Seen as an avenue to help 
supplement horse racing purses, as well as pension and health plans for 
Pennsylvania’s horsemen, the state’s 36% tax rate dwarfs the rates of 
Nevada, New Jersey, and Mississippi combined.115 Despite this heavy tax, 
Pennsylvania bettors placed over $59 million in total sports wagers in July 
of 2019, a new monthly high for the state, due in large part to online 
wagering, which accounted for over two-thirds of all bets placed in the 
state.116 Compare these figures with those of Pennsylvania’s casino 
market, which has become the second-largest in the United States behind 
only Nevada despite an astronomical 54% tax rate on slot revenue.117 
According to state officials, Pennsylvania’s casinos have generated at least 
$2.3 billion in slot machine revenue alone over each of the past eight 
years.118  
 
110  See id.  
111  See id.  
112  Id.   
113  See Pennsylvania Online Sports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT, 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/pa/ (last updated Sept. 5, 2019, 4:24 PM).  
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115  See id.  
116  Press Release, Pennsylvania Gaming Control Bd. Reports Gaming Revenue For July, 
Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board (Aug. 16, 2019) (on file with author).  
117  See Steven Ruddock, PA Sports Betting Off to Reasonably Fast Start Despite High 
Tax Rate, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (Jan. 23, 2019, 2:05 PM), 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/27911/pa-sports-betting-tax/.  
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G. Rhode Island 
Rhode Island legislators signed a sports betting bill into law on June 
22, 2018.119 The state’s gaming operations, which are overseen by the 
Rhode Island Lottery, are limited to just two casinos, the Twin River 
Casino in Lincoln and the Twin River Casino in Tiverton.120 Rhode Island 
has perhaps the most interesting tax revenue split of any state to legalize 
sports betting to this point: 51% of every dollar wagered in Rhode Island 
sportsbooks goes back to the state’s treasury, and 32% goes to 
International Game Technology, the partner of the state’s casinos helping 
to operate sports betting.121 After those taxes are paid out, 17% of the 
remaining sports betting revenue stays in the hands of the respective 
casinos.122 
III. LET’S TALK OVERSIGHT  
A. Calls for Oversight: Arguments in Favor and Against  
i. Orrin Hatch and Chuck Schumer  
Before sundown on the day that the Murphy decision was handed 
down, Senator Orrin Hatch issued a public statement and memo 
announcing his intent to submit federal legislation on sports betting.123 As 
one of the architects of the now-defunct PASPA, Senator Hatch (R-UT) 
seemed to make it his swan song to once again place his name on a federal 
mandate on sports gambling.124 On August 23rd, Senator Hatch promised 
on the Senate floor that a new piece of federal legislation would “kick-
start” the federal discussion on sports betting, despite the fact that three 
states were already running full steam ahead with their own legalized 
sports gambling operations.125  
Similarly, Senator Chuck Schumer (D-NY) authored a memo directed 
at the Senate on August 29th, which outlined his proposed federal 
 
119  Rhode Island Sports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT, 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/ri (last updated Apr. 29, 2019, 12:15 AM).  
120  See id.  
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123  See Jordain Carney, Hatch to Introduce Sports Betting Bill After Supreme Court 
Decision, THE HILL (May 14, 2018, 1:17 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/floor-
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124  See Jill R. Dorson, Need for Federal Sports Betting Law Just a Vanity Project for 
Hatch, SPORTS HANDLE (Aug. 28, 2018), https://sportshandle.com/need-for-federal-sports-
betting-law-just-a-vanity-project-for-hatch/. 
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framework for sports betting regulation.126 Senator Schumer took the 
position of an ‘everyman sports fan,’ arguing that federal oversight was 
imperative to protect “the sports games we all love to watch[.]”127 
Specifically, Senator Schumer gave three major suggestions in the 
memo.128 First, he suggested the implementation of a legal sports betting 
age, similar to age twenty-one for alcohol sales, and also suggested that 
casinos be prohibited from advertising to young people.129 Second, 
Senator Schumer recommended that entities accepting wagers on sporting 
events should be required to share information and suspicious trends with 
the leagues in order to “protect the integrity of the game[.]”130 Lastly, 
Senator Schumer suggested that “official league data” should be required 
to determine the outcomes of consumers’ wagers, as well as some level of 
involvement for the major sports leagues in determining which betting 
options private casinos and sportsbooks may offer.131 In other words, the 
Senator suggested “protect[ing] consumers and individuals placing bets” 
by creating one official database for each league that the sportsbooks 
would be required to purchase and follow in setting odds for bettors.132  
ii. The American Gaming Association  
The Senators’ suggestions were followed by immediate pushback 
from numerous organizations.133 Namely, Sara Slane—the Senior Vice 
President of Public Affairs for the AGA—took issue with each of the 
Senators’ suggestions in a September 13, 2018 letter addressed to Senator 
Schumer.134 Ms. Slane expressed the AGA’s disdain for the Senators’ 
 
126  See Darren Rovell, Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer Suggests Federal 
Framework for Sports Betting, ESPN (Aug. 29, 2018), 
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hands-on approach to an industry that had just taken its first steps in 
decades toward liberation.135 She discussed the AGA’s position that there 
was actually no need for federal oversight, further expressing the 
sentiment that oversight can be achieved through “robust state 
regulation.”136 Crucially, the AGA asserted that “there is neither a need 
nor a legal precedent” to require sportsbook operators to purchase “official 
league data.”137 Instead, Slane wrote that “[a] healthy market of accurate, 
consistent sports betting data providers already exists and sportsbooks 
already avail themselves of such services in the commercial market.”138 
And this makes sense, too: one official data company is much more likely 
to become corrupted and to set inflated prices that discourage competition 
than is a variety of data providers like the market that currently exists.139 
Lastly, Slane fought Schumer’s suggestion that leagues ought to be 
involved in the types of wagers that sportsbooks would be allowed to 
accept,140 arguing that sportsbook operators already have a significant 
economic incentive to avoid offering bets that pose a significant risk.141  
iii. NBA, NFL, etc. Executives’ Approach  
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy, the National 
Basketball Association’s (“NBA”) Assistant General Counsel and Senior 
Vice President Dan Spillane supplemented the New York State Senate’s 
discussion before the Committee on Racing, Gaming, and Wagering with 
testimony providing the NBA’s opinion on federal oversight for sports 
gambling.142 Spillane pinpointed a few key components that should be 
included in a comprehensive sports betting bill.143 First, he suggested that 
such legislation should include transparency between gaming operators 
and the leagues regarding information on wagers on their leagues.144 
Specifically, Spillane suggested that gaming operators should be required 
to (a) inform the sports leagues of unusual betting activity, and (b) 
maintain centralized betting data to assist gaming operators in monitoring 
 
135  See id.  
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bets from one jurisdiction to the next.145 Next, Spillane suggested that 
leagues should possess the right to restrict gaming operators from offering 
certain wagers on their events.146 Furthermore, Spillane echoed the 
NCAA’s policy argument in Murphy, calling for rigorous licensing 
programs to ensure that sportsbook operators were properly vetted, as well 
as age restrictions for consumers, and measures to address problem 
gambling.147  
Perhaps most importantly, Spillane suggested that the sports leagues 
will inherently assume an increased risk as a result of an increase in wagers 
on sports contests.148 The NBA suggested that in order “[t]o compensate 
leagues for the risk and expense created by betting and the commercial 
value our product creates for betting operators, it would be reasonable for 
operators to pay each league one percent of the total amount bet on its 
games.”149 This one-percent requirement is now commonly referred to as 
“integrity fees.”150 Recently, integrity fees have been widely popularized 
by the major sports leagues as a way for the leagues to find additional 
profit in a world where it is now legal to wager on their product.151 In short, 
integrity fees would provide the leagues with a set percentage commission 
of the total bets wagered on their respective games in order to compensate 
each league for the increase in the amount of time and money that they 
will have to spend on data monitoring and integrity protocols.152 
iv. The “Other” September 27th Hearing  
In late September 2018, while the vast majority of the nation was 
captivated by the  confirmation hearings of now-Supreme Court Justice 
Brett Kavanaugh, a House Judiciary subcommittee was meeting just down 
the hall of the Capitol Building.153 On the afternoon of September 27, 
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2018, Congressman Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI) provided his opening 
remarks in a House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime hearing, the purpose 
of which was to discuss the possibility of federal legislation to oversee 
states’ authorization of sports gambling.154 There, Congressman 
Sensenbrenner outlined four possible options for Congress to consider in 
the coming months.155  
First, Congress could once again attempt to ban sports betting 
altogether.156 That is, to come up with a piece of legislation similar to 
PASPA, without running afoul of any constitutional states’ rights.157 
Reading Justice Alito’s opinion in Murphy, this is a possible option; 
however, this option is the least plausible of the four at this juncture.158  
Second, Congress could choose to maintain what has now become the 
status quo in a post-Murphy world.159 That is, continue to allow the states 
to regulate themselves on all issues relating to their own respective sports 
betting operations.160 Maintaining the current sports betting climate would 
agree with the values of organizations like the American Gaming 
Association and many of the states that have already passed sports 
gambling legislation, but would come to the chagrin of the professional 
sports leagues, and certain Senators such as Hatch and Schumer.161  
Third, Congress could create a meet-you-in-the-middle type of system 
that poses minimal disruption to the status quo. This type of legislation 
would impose required standards and restrictions on states should they 
choose to authorize sports gambling operations.162 Simply put, Congress 
could choose a route that results in minimal regulation through a means of 
minimal standards and requirements that states must meet in order to 
provide a healthy sports betting market.163 For now, it seems that this is 
the most likely option, though there is criticism that even minimal federal 
regulation is unnecessary.164 After all, many states would argue that most 
of the regulations put into place by new legislation are already covered in 
many of the states’ own sports betting laws.165  
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Lastly, there is the option of full federal regulation of the sports betting 
industry.166 A complete framework for federal oversight of the growing 
sports betting industry theoretically has no bounds: mandated integrity 
fees and official league data, age restrictions on state sponsored sports 
betting, and a host of other requirements that could be imposed on the 
states could be within Congress’ regulatory reach.167 
B. A Discussion on Integrity Fees  
To make a fully advised decision on which of the outlined 
Congressional approaches is most warranted, a total grasp of the 
intricacies of each approach is necessary. One of those intricacies is the 
integrity fee, which would provide the sports leagues with a set percentage 
commission of the total bets wagered on their respective leagues.168 
According to Spillane, integrity fees are justified because a legal sports 
betting market will force the leagues to invest time, effort, and resources 
into compliance programs that include bet monitoring and investigating.169 
This compensation would, in theory, help to alleviate any burden placed 
on the leagues for the increase in capital and resources that they will have 
to spend on increased data monitoring and integrity protocols.170  
Proponents of integrity fees have provided many reasons in support of 
such a fee.171 The most obvious reason being that integrity fees will help 
the sports leagues offset the increase in resources they will have to allocate 
toward compliance programs in response to the proliferation of sports 
gambling.172 There are certainly costs associated with the rise in sports 
betting volume that league offices will incur.173 If implemented correctly, 
an integrity fee should theoretically provide an unquestionable increase in 
overall integrity.174 However, before Congress places an integrity fee 
requirement on sportsbooks across the country, we must ask: is there not 
another way to recompense the sports leagues for their hardship?175 After 
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all, don’t the sports leagues already stand to gain from a healthy sports 
betting market in and of itself?176  
 While the leagues will not receive direct monetary compensation 
from legal sports betting, a 2018 Nielsen Sports survey illustrates that, at 
a minimum, the secondary effects of state-sponsored sports betting are 
vast.177 Those effects can be broken down into two categories: revenue 
from fan engagement and gaming-related revenue.178  
Revenue from fan engagement would include increased revenue from 
media rights, sponsorship, merchandise sales, and ticket sales.179 The 2018 
Nielsen study estimated that in a legal sports betting environment, the NFL 
would receive a $2.326 billion increase in total revenue, with $1.753 
billion generated by fan engagement revenue and $573 million in gaming-
related revenue.180 The NBA would receive an extra $585 million, with 
$425 million generated by fan engagement revenue and $160 million in 
gaming-related revenue.181 The NHL figures are $216 million in total: 
$151 million from more fan engagement and $65 million from gaming-
related revenue.182 And the MLB would receive an increase of $1.106 
billion in total revenue, represented by an increase of $952 million in fan 
engagement revenue and a $154 million in gaming-revenue.183 In total, the 
study estimates that a fully healthy sports betting market would drive an 
increase of $4.2 billion in profits for the four major professional sports 
leagues combined,184 not including profits for the NCAA, where 
Americans wagered $10.4 billion on March Madness alone in 2017.185 
In contrast, various reports estimate that in a fully healthy sports 
betting market, state-sponsored sportsbooks would take in about $200 
billion in annual handle, or wagered bets alone.186 Using this figure, a one 
percent integrity fee would amount to $2 billion that sportsbooks would 
be required to hand over to the leagues each year from wagered bets 
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alone.187 From December 2016 through November 2017, Nevada 
sportsbooks had a handle of over $4.8 billion.188 Viewing this $2 billion 
figure in light of the handle from 2016-2017 in Nevada sportsbooks, we 
can estimate that a 1 percent integrity fee would allot $600 million to the 
NCAA, $480 million to the MLB, $440 million to the NFL, $300 million 
to the NBA, and $160 million to other sports.189 The MLB, for example, 
would receive $480 million from an integrity fee to support increased 
compliance costs.190 However, that $480 million figure pales in 
comparison to the $1.106 billion the league would receive to just exist in 
a healthy sports betting market.191  
C. The End Result: The Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act 
of 2018 
On December 19, 2018, Senators Hatch and Schumer took the first 
step in a long, drawn out process that could eventually result in 
comprehensive legislation providing federal oversight to the expanding 
legal sports betting market.192 The aim of the bill is not to ban sports 
betting, but to “maintain a distinct [f]ederal interest in the integrity and 
character of professional and amateur sporting contests.”193 While the bill 
did not pass in 2018, Hatch—who retired from the Senate at the end of the 
year—hoped that the bill would serve as a starting point for the 2019 
Congress when it is time to pick up discussions and reintroduce the bill. 
So, what does that starting point look like?  
To start, legal sportsbooks that have already opened across seven 
states, including sportsbooks in Nevada, would not be exempt from 
complying with federal standards.194 Importantly, the bill would “[r]equire 
that sports wagering operators use data provided or licensed by sports 
organizations to determine the outcome of sports wagers through 2024, 
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and set requirements for data used thereafter.”195 The bill would also 
establish a process to allow the sports leagues to request to restrict certain 
sports wagers if they believe it would be necessary to protect the integrity 
of the contest.196 Furthermore, the bill would “[p]rohibit sports wagering 
by individuals younger than 21; athletes, coaches, officials, and others 
associated with sports organizations; and individuals convicted of certain 
federal crimes related to sports wagering.”197 Additionally, the bill’s final 
page included a severability clause, which was a cause for debate in 
Murphy.198 Under this provision, any invalidity in the bill would not render 
the entire bill invalid, only that specific portion of the bill.199 Notably, the 
bill failed to mention anything of substance regarding integrity fees.200 
Despite bipartisan support, the bill did not enjoy significant support 
from the professional sports leagues and the NCAA, but they were in the 
minority.201 Lawmakers and the gaming industry alike chimed in to 
express their disapproval.202 Specifically, Sara Slane of the AGA called 
the bill the “epitome of a solution in search of a problem” and a “non-
starter for the gaming industry.”203 
IV. THE SPORTS WAGERING MARKET INTEGRITY ACT OF 2018: 
FLAWS AND SOLUTIONS 
At the very least, Schumer and Hatch’s Sports Wagering Market 
Integrity Act of 2018 (“SWMIA”) does serve as a starting place for a 
broader conversation about sports betting.  
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A. The Flaws 
i. Integrity Fees 
A major talking point after the Murphy decision was the integrity fee 
conversation. Just about any group you could find that was in favor of 
federal oversight—most importantly, the professional sports leagues—
was also in favor of imposing an integrity fee on state-sponsored 
sportsbooks.204 It could be inferred from the SWMIA that any talk of 
integrity fees throughout the year received little Congressional support, 
resulting in any language on integrity fees being stricken from the 
SWMIA.205 I surmise that this omission will likely remain unchanged 
moving forward, given that there has been no state that has included 
integrity fees in its own sports wagering legislation. Furthermore, 
evidence strongly suggests that the existence of legalized sports gambling 
alone would bring plenty of profit to the sports leagues,206 thus, it seems 
unlikely that any federal legislation would include an integrity fee 
requirement.  
It would seem that the major sports leagues should have plenty of 
capital to uphold the integrity of their sports without imposing an 
additional $2 billion in unwarranted integrity fees. Moreover, the 
aforementioned figures are not the only bases for opposing integrity fees. 
For starters, integrity fees would take away from state revenue, likely 
making it a tough sell to get states to hand over a share of profits to the 
leagues.207 Even if there were an integrity fee requirement, states would 
inevitably be left with a choice: lower their tax rates in order to give the 
leagues more money, or raise their rates to achieve their own initial profit 
goals.208 Regardless, I expect that the costs associated with an integrity fee 
would eventually just be passed off to consumers in the form of worse 
odds and payouts, given that an integrity fee would likely reduce state 
profits. If the goal is to transition sports betting to regulated markets, states 
should be interested in keeping costs down. Integrity fees, whether in a 
state sports betting bill or federal legislation, would not keep costs down.  
ii. Data Requirement 
The most challenging provision of the SWMIA is likely the 
requirement that sports wagering operators use data provided or licensed 
by the sports leagues to determine the outcome of sports wagers through 
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at least 2024.209 This requirement likely elicits a myriad of concerns, not 
the least of which are constitutional. That is, a government mandate that 
state-sponsored private organizations be restricted to certain sources of 
information could run afoul of the First Amendment. Furthermore, aside 
from the policy concerns related to hindering the marketplace of ideas 
among private organizations, intuitive notions of economic competition 
suggest that the openness of the current market for data providers is an 
added incentive for sportsbook operators to access the best and fastest 
information possible.210   
In an alternative world where the sports leagues hold a monopoly over 
official data, a two-folded problem is presented. First, a mandate that every 
sports book contract with only the sports leagues for official data risks 
granting the sports leagues the authority to set inflated, non-competitive 
pricing. These inflated prices would not only stuff the pockets of the sports 
leagues but would do so at the expensive of the sportsbooks’ net profit. 
Accordingly, this decrease in profit margin would likely result in 
sportsbooks passing the burden on to consumers. The eventual result of 
such a dynamic could have an effect of drawing consumers away from the 
regulated U.S. market, and toward illegal offshore markets. 
Second, the current market for sports data is vast. It is hard to say how 
many providers already exist. Assuming that sportsbooks operators want 
to contract with the best service providers, it makes sense that this market 
is so large. Conversely, a single-provider market is counterintuitive: it 
likely disincentivizes efficiency of sports book operators and is likely 
more prone to corruption. After all, it is much tougher to defraud an entire 
market than a single provider.    
iii. Restrictions on Sports Wagers 
Another feature of the SWMIA that is likely to be disputed is a 
proposed provision allowing the sports leagues to restrict state-sponsored 
sportsbooks from offering certain sports wagers.211 Of course, the 
provision that made it into the bill is milder than what was championed 
earlier in 2018.212 Under the proposed legislation, the decision of whether 
to offer a certain sports wager would ultimately be at the discretion of each 
state’s regulatory entity.213 Proponents of this provision, such as the sports 
leagues and Senators Hatch and Schumer, justify it by suggesting that such 
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discretion is necessary to ensure that the integrity of the sport is 
maintained.214 In practice, however, I surmise that discretion to police 
integrity is ambiguous to the extent that it could result in a league-friendly 
ruling by the state regulatory agencies. For example, if the NFL requests 
that a state’s sportsbooks not offer a prop bet on the length of the national 
anthem before the Super Bowl, it is likely that the regulatory agency will 
follow the NFL’s recommendation to not upset the NFL, rather than out 
of caution for integrity.  
Perhaps more importantly, the underlying rationale for this particular 
provision stemmed from the fear that certain types of bets are susceptible 
to manipulation in the betting market.215 Yet, this rationale is likely not 
enough to uphold the provision for a couple of reasons. First, sports book 
operators already have a significant economic incentive to avoid exposure 
to the risk inherent in shady wagers. Second, restricting a certain bet that 
has an ostensible customer demand would likely not go over too well with 
those customers. If consumers demand the bet enough, the consumer will 
simply seek out an illegal sports book operator who does not adhere to 
these rules, and will accept the bet.216 Thus, a provision allowing the sports 
leagues to restrict certain sports wagers counteracts the goal of federal 
oversight to eliminate consumers running to the offshore market.217  
B. The Solutions 
The American Sports Betting Coalition believes that in a post-PASPA 
world, one of the four core principles Congress should adhere to is to 
“ensure a tax regime [that] does not undermine regulated sports betting 
operations’ ability to compete against illegal and offshore operators.”218 
State legislatures are more than capable of setting appropriate rates 
according to their needs, as evidenced by the varying rates at which states 
choose to tax their sportsbooks.219  
However, state tax rates post-Murphy are not guaranteed to remain the 
same, and a regime that leaves taxation entirely up the states could prove 
dangerous. Take Pennsylvania for example: it has sustained its early 
revenue success despite maintaining tax rates on sportsbooks as high as 
36%. Is there anything preventing other states from imposing similarly 
high rates? In fact, West Virginia state legislators are already realizing that 
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they may be leaving profit on the table by preserving a tax rate of 10%.220 
Therefore, a “race to the top” tax rate may be imminent.  
Though great for state revenues, a race to the top tax regime would 
certainly undermine sports betting operators’ ability to compete against 
illegal and offshore operators. If other states across the east coast are 
pressured to ante up their tax rates to keep up with Pennsylvania, I predict 
that the costs will almost certainly be passed on to the consumers, 
ultimately resulting in consumers fleeing for unregulated, offshore 
operations.221 Thus, if the common goal is to eliminate illegal and offshore 
sports book operators, advocates of PASPA and the SWMIA should 
support federal oversight of state tax rates on regulated sportsbooks.  
In summary, I contend that a revised edition of the Sports Wagering 
and Market Integrity Act of 2018 should: (1) continue to exclude integrity 
fees; (2) eliminate any provision granting the sports leagues the right to 
restrict sportsbooks from offering certain wagers; (3) eliminate any 
official league data requirement; and (4) include a maximum rate at which 
states may levy taxes on their sports book operators.   
V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision to end the federal ban on sports betting 
is one that has already opened the door for hundreds of jobs and billions 
of dollars in state tax revenue. Accordingly, social groups and business 
organizations continue to advocate the position that sports betting should 
now be left entirely up to the states post-Murphy. On the other hand, a 
group of federal legislators continue to advocate for federal oversight of 
state-sponsored sports betting, ultimately cumulating in The Sports 
Wagering and Market Integrity Act of 2018. While the SWMIA’s 
provisions are mostly counteractive to their sponsors’ goals, a decision to 
forgo federal oversight is likely not warranted. Instead, Congress should 
draft legislation that preserves for the states the decision of whether to 
sanction sports betting, with the caveat that states who do choose to 
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